The principle of Member States’ procedural autonomy on the 50th anniversary of the Rewe and Comet cases Carlos Torres1 I. Introduction. – II. The cases Rewe and Comet: equivalence and effectiveness principles. – III. The limitations were introduced at the turn of the millennium. The fort growth of consumer law and the Europeanisation of civil procedure. – IV. Tension between procedural autonomy and harmonisation. Principle expressing national sovereignty or delimitation of competences. – V. The Different Faces of Procedural Autonomy: A Chameleon-like Figure The paper examines the evolving concept of Member States’ “procedural autonomy” in the application of EU law, from its early formulation in the Rewe and Comet cases to its progressive restriction. It explains how the landmark judgments Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL established direct effect and primacy of EU law, making national courts key enforcers of Union rights. Initially, Member States could shape their own procedural rules, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. However, the growth of EU consumer law, the Europeanisation of civil procedure, and the consolidation of rights such as effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter have led to increasing harmonisation. The paper argues that this dense regulatory and judicial framework has substantially reduced genuine procedural autonomy, exposing a persistent tension between national sovereignty and EU-level uniformity. Keywords: Procedural autonomy of Member States, principles of equivalence and effectiveness, Europeanisation of civil procedure, EU fundamental rights in civil proceedings, tension between national sovereignty and harmonisation. DOI 10.60559/ijtthl2026-004 1 Estoril Higher Institute for Tourism and Hotel Studies, email: carlos.torres@eshte.pt
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