(“Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais”)24. The Parliament approved the Proposal and subsequently the Government approved a focused amendment to article 9 CA25 specifically addressing the tourism-related activity by introducing the following: “ f) In the context of supply of goods or accommodation services in tourism projects or local accommodations, when the counterpart or any other entity cannot offer, in an electronic platform or in a physical accommodation, the prices or sale conditions which are more advantageous than the ones offered by the intermediary which develops its activity in the same platform”. (underlined added) It remains to be seen whether the same amendment brings increased enforcement on the same type of contractual relations, given that article 9 CA already prohibits such type of practices, but the political message is clear. Examples of investigations and decisions caught by articles 101 TFEU and/ or article 9 CA or equivalent legal provisions in other jurisdictions within the EU include notably the following three cases: Between 2010 and 2015, the Commission has investigated the three worldwide airline alliances existing at the time and has accepted commitments to address its concerns that the cooperation between the member airlines could harm competition in relation to passenger and cargo air transport the same had entered into in given routes26. In 21.02.2020, the Commission has fined Spanish hotel group Meliá €6 678 000 for including restrictive clauses in its agreements with tour operators. According to the Commission, “These clauses discriminate consumers within the European Economic Area (EEA) based on their place of residence, in breach of EU antitrust rules. At the same time, the Commission closed proceedings opened in 2017 against four tour operators”27. 24 Decree-Law Nr. 446/85, of 25 october, as amended. 25 Decree-Law 108/2021, of 7 December, which amends the above referred 3 legal frameworks. In the Preamble it is stated that such an approach follows the ones adopted in other jurisdictions of the EU. In our view, regard should be taken to the circumstance that in jurisdictions such as the German one, the developments occurred at judicial level. 26 See the Commission’s press release of 12.05.2015 concerning the acceptance of commitments by SkyTeam members Air France/KLM, Alitalia and Delta following an investigation. More information available at https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4966. Examples of commitments accepted by the Commission and being rendered legally binding were the following: (i) make available landing and take-off slots at Amsterdam, Rome and/or New York airports on the Amsterdam-New York and Rome-New York routes; (ii) enter into agreements which would enable competitors to offer tickets on the parties’ flights on the three routes (“fare combinability agreements”); (iii) enter into agreements which would facilitate access to the parties’ connecting traffic on the three routes (“special prorate agreements”); (iv) provide access to their frequent flyer programmes on all three routes. Their duration is of ten years. 27 Case AT. 40528 - Melia (Holiday Pricing). Press release available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_302. According to this text: “The Commission investigation showed that Meliá entered 133 THE SWEET&SOUR TASTE OF TOURISM AND COMPETITION LAW INTERACTION
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