Even concentrations which do not trigger the thresholds are under the scope of competition rules. As an example, restrictions to competition such as no compete, no solicitation and given confidentiality obligations may also rise competition concerns under 101 TFEU (and the equivalent national provisions) to the extent they are not considered ancillary restrictions to the same concentration50 and neither can be justified under 101(3) TFEU. Examples of concentrations having been scrutinized by the PCA in Portugal in the “tourism sector” include notably airlines and undertakings present in hotel and leisure activities51. 1.4. State aid rules and the tourism sector Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”. This rule comprises 2 types of exceptions provided in the same legal provision. The second includes aid that “may be considered to be compatible with the internal market”, notably aid to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” 52, which served as legal basis for aid provided to companies by EU Member States during the COVID 19 pandemics before specific soft law was adopted by the Commission53. In this context, the tourism sector was impacted by state aid covering a wide range of activities and geographies, as different as aid to air carriers of different Member States54 or the Portuguese aid to guarantee schemes for small 50 Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, published in OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 24–31. 51 These include for example cases Ccent/2017/49 - Travel Service / CSA, Ccent. 2/2020 Bidco/Prifalésia Ccent. 13/2020 Barceló / Deneb and Ccent. 21/2021 – Levantur*Aperture / Sociedade Conjunta. 52 Article 107(3)(b) second part TFEU. 53 See the Temporary Framework for State aid – COVID 19 mentioned above in note 8. 54 For example, In April 2020 the Commission approved two separate aid measures by Denmark and Sweden in favour of the airline SAS, each consisting of a guarantee on a revolving credit facility of up to 1.5 billion Swedish krona (SEK). Those measures were intended to compensate SAS in part for the damage resulting from the cancellation or rescheduling of its flights as a result of the travel restrictions introduced in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Commission Decision C(2020) 2416 final on State aid SA.56795 (2020/N) – Denmark – Compensation for the damage caused to SAS by the COVID-19 pandemic, of 15 April 2020 and Commission Decision C(2020) 2784 final on State aid SA. 57061 (2020/N) – Sweden – Compensation for the damage caused to SAS by the COVID-19 pandemic of 24 April 2020. Competing airline Ryanair challenged those decisions before the GCEU and the latter dismissed those actions by judgments of 14 April 2021, T-378/20 Ryanair v Commission (SAS, Denmark; COVID19) and T-379/20 Ryanair v Commission (SAS, Sweden; COVID-19). Subsequently, Ryanair brought appeals 139 THE SWEET&SOUR TASTE OF TOURISM AND COMPETITION LAW INTERACTION
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