ways of holding the agency liable: liability for damages caused by things and liability for the acts of others. Will the agency be liable for certain items it uses for the benefit of tourists? Does it have custody of them? And will the agency be liable for the actions of the people to whom it has entrusted the performance of services?”. The author discusses contractual liability regarding objects in French law, particularly examining situations where an object causes harm within a contractual relationship. It highlights the difficulty of applying Article 1384 of the Civil Code, which governs liability for things (choses que l’on a sous sa garde), to contractual scenarios due to the principle against combining different types of liability. Couvrat explores judicial decisions 9 involving travel agencies and transport companies, illustrating how courts determine who is the “guardian” of a harmful object and whether liability is contractual or tortious. Ultimately, it emphasises that a client typically cannot invoke tortious liability against a contracting party for harm caused by an object, with such actions generally reserved for third parties. The main issue examined is whether travel agencies can be held contractually responsible for the actions of carriers and hoteliers. In the sixties, different legal perspectives arose regarding the extent to which travel agencies can be held liable for the acts of carriers and hoteliers. The René Rodière position (limited or non-existent liability) argues against the existence of contractual liability for the acts of others. His review of 9 The Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence, on 14 July 1962, addressed the question of compensation for a tourist injured in a bus accident, focusing on who had custody (“garde”) of the bus. The court concluded that the transporter was the “gardien” because they maintained control, direction, and use of the vehicle, employing their own resources and possessing the best knowledge of its condition. The ruling emphasised that the victim’s legal action against the transporter was delictual (tortious) and should not have considered the travel agency as a potential “gardien” or allowed for the transfer of “garde,” as this would blur the lines between contractual and delictual liability. Similarly, the Seine Commercial Tribunal, on 12 January 1954 (Revue Française de Droit Aérien, 1954, 87), noted that an aircraft remained in the custody of the carrier and not of the travel agency. More justifiable in this regard is the decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Seine, dated March 13, 1963, and the Paris Court of Appeal, dated June 30, 1964, before which a similar issue of determining the custodian arose following a coach accident in Hungary. By well-established case law, the carrier, in this case the coach driver, was classified as the custodian of the vehicle and, by Hungarian case law on dangerous operation, was declared liable for the accident that occurred to a third party. However, this was an action brought by a third party, and Article 1384 could very well have been invoked—unsuccessfully, however, but that is irrelevant—against the travel agency. If the agency can be declared liable for the acts of things in its care towards victims with whom it has not signed any contract, if it can also be held liable towards the successors-in-interest of deceased contracting victims, it can be stated on the contrary that this specifically tortious action can never be invoked against it by a client, whatever the damage. The case law as a whole is in this direction. The only exception we have been able to identify arises from a confusion between liability for acts of things (responsibilité du fait des choses) and liability for the acts of others (responsabilité du fait d`autrui). 200 CARLOS TORRES
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTE4NzM5Nw==