inevitable fragmentation, with added confusion coming from both the specific regulations of member states, the discipline of geographical indications, the regional classifications, and, finally, the rules of self-discipline of the various associations of producers and external certification bodies. In fact, we must not forget that the main purpose of the European Union's action with regard to consumer protection is to provide information that consumers are able to use to make informed choices4 . In turn, this line of action stems from studies on consumer behavior and a soft law approach to remedy their natural cognitive errors5 . It is therefore essential, for this approach to be truly effective, that the information be correct, complete but also easily understood by the average consumer, thus avoiding the risks of both misleading information and so-called information overload, which makes it more difficult for the consumer to distinguish information that is useful for his or her economic choices from information that is essentially irrelevant6 . In this respect, the quantitative, rather than qualitative, approach chosen by the European legislator, despite its laudable intentions, has been only partially successful. While it is certainly understandable that one wants to give due weight to completeness of information, it is also true that, in the presence of a large amount of information, companies tend to emphasize attractive visual elements on product labels, which tend to attract the consumer's attention by distracting him from the purely informative elements that are more relevant to 4Article 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that 'in order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests'. 5D. KAHNEMANN, A. TVERSKY, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, in Econometrica, 1979; R. H. THALER, The Winner's Curse. Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life, Princeton University Press, 1992 and Misbehaving. The Making of Behavioral Economics, New York, 2005; R. H. THALER & C. R. SUNSTEIN, Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, New York, 2008; C. R. SUNSTEIN, Why nudge?, New Haven - London, 2014 6 N. K. MALHOTRA, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigming Consumer Decision Making, in Journal of Consumer Research, 1984; N. K. MALHOTRA, A. K. JAIN, & S. W. LAGAKOS, The Information Overload Controversy: An Alternative Viewpoint, in Journal of Marketing, 1982; J. JACOBY, Perspectives on Information Overload, in Journal of Consumer Research, 1984.
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