25 come the end (and not the mere instrument) of the system and, consequently, that the economic result, pursued by the enterprise, is not "exhaustive neither of the end, nor of the means, nor of the method but leave open the door to other demands and values also of social morality...(omissis) ... Therefore, if one cannot claim to erase profit from the entrepreneurial goal and method, even less can the legal and social legitimacy of the enterprise be subordinated to the pursuit of profit or orient the discipline of the enterprise in exclusive function of the pursuit of profit or consider the realization or the respect of any other value involved in business activity only in order to reconcile with the subjective goal of profit rather than with the objective end of productivity"52. The existence, moreover, of a plurality of meanings attributable to the market means that it is possible to study it under multiple perspectives, depending on whether it is understood as a guarantee, as a denial of freedom, as a place of personal merit, as a network of cooperation, or as a conflict arena. The market, in its wide sense, represents the whole of society53 and, like all societies, can be defined as free only if it guarantees maximum autonomy to the individuals participating in it. Hence the importance of the market as a presupposition of personal freedoms and the need for an ethical and juridical direction of economic life through an external guarantor54. If this were 52 See G. OPPO, Business Law and Social Morality, in Rev. dir. civ. 1992, p. 19. 53 Cf. in this sense P. PERLINGIERI, Market, solidarity and human rights, in Rass. dir. civ. , 1, 1995, p. 84. 54 The idea of the market, in its naturalistic sense, is therefore lacking, given that it is rather a matter of a normative regime of economic relations. In this sense N. IRTI, General Theory of Law and Market Problem, in Rev. dir. civ. 1999, I, p. 26, where it is said, in fact, that the market is nothing more than a statute of norms and that the investigations aimed at studying the market have as their object the plurality of the normative statutes. In accordance with conf. A. PALAZZO E I. FERRANTI, Ethics of Private Law, Vol. II, Padua, 2002, 1, p. 267, where the authors in support of their theses consider that: "while it is true that the market needs rules it is also true that such rules need not necessarily be legislative. Reducing the market to a mere set of positive rules seems reductive to us, since it would force a complex and constantly evolving social phenomenon within the narrow limits of positive law (national and Community). Nor is it intended to degrade the legal norms to a secondary element and subordinate to the market understood in the sense of social phenomenon...(omits)... The examination of reality reveals not only that the market does not exist without rules but above all that they are not, exclusively and necessarily, positive and legislative, the rules may be accepted by operators irrespective of any support from an established authority. This confirms the spontaneity that is claimed to the concept of the market".
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