II. THE CASES REWE AND COMET: EQUIVALENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLES In 1976, in the Rewe4 and Comet5 judgments, the Court of Justice held that, 4 The Court of Justice’s judgment of 16 December 1976 (Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and G, Rewe-Zentral AG / Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland) pioneered the definition of Member States’ procedural autonomy and introduced the structural principles of equivalence and effectiveness, wich are central to the uniform application of EU law. It arose from a preliminary ruling by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German Supreme Administrative Court) on the compatibility with Community law of national duties levied on the importation of apples of French origin and of the national procedural regime for the restitution of amounts unduly paid under Articles 5, 9 and 13(2) of the EEC Treaty. The national dispute concerned the payment, in 1968, of fees imposed under the phytosanitary control of imported horticultural products, which the Court of Justice had already held equivalent to customs duties in a previous judgment (case 39/73). The importers appealed, seeking the annulment of the administrative collection decisions and the reimbursement of the amounts paid, including interest, but their claim was rejected on the ground, in particular, of the inadmissibility of the appeal for failure to comply with the national procedural deadlines set out in the Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (German Administrative Procedure Code). The first question submitted by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht concerned the prohibition of customs duties and charges of equivalent effect, which had been in force since 1 January 1968 and allowed individuals to invoke the corresponding rule directly before national courts to obtain a refund of charges illegally levied on horticultural products of Community origin. The second question concerned the existence, under Community law, of a right to restitution (and possible annulment of the administrative act) where prohibited charges have been paid, particularly when national procedural deadlines have been exceeded, and whether a citizen can directly invoke Community law to circumvent the preclusion established by domestic law. The Court observes that the EEC Treaty directly confers rights on citizens, whose protection is primarily entrusted to national courts, which apply Community law within the framework of their domestic legal order. However, in the absence of specific provisions in Community law governing the procedural modalities for the protection of these rights, it is for each Member State’s domestic legal order to designate the competent courts and to establish the procedural rules for actions intended to ensure the protection of these rights. These national modalities should not make the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law impossible or unduly difficult in practice, but the Treaty itself does not harmonise the time limits and forms of appeal. Regarding appeal time limits, the Court affirms that the requirement of legal certainty justifies national legislation establishing reasonable limitation periods for challenging administrative acts, even when rights arising from Community law are at stake. The mere fact that an administrative act may be incompatible with Community law does not prevent national appeal time limits from being enforced against it, provided that these time limits are no less favourable than those applicable to similar actions of a domestic nature and do not make the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law impossible. The Court underlines that there is no general prohibition under current Community law against a State invoking the expiry of the time limit for appeals against a citizen seeking to challenge, before a national court, an administrative act allegedly contrary to Community law. Thus, in response to the questions posed, the Court concludes that: “In the present state of Community law there is nothing to prevent a citizen who contests before a national court a decision of a national authority on the ground that it is incompatible with Community law from being confronted with the defence that limitation periods laid down by national law have expired, it being understood that the procedural conditions governing the action may not be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature.”. 5 The Court of Justice’s decision in Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen addresses whether national procedural time limits can restrict actions based on directly applicable Community law, specifically the prohibition on export charges equivalent to customs duties under Article 16 of the EEC Treaty and under Regulation 234/68. Comet sought reimbursement of an improperly charged fee but missed the national deadline for contesting the assessment. The Court held that, although Articles 16 of the EEC Treaty and 10 of Regulation 234/68 confer directly applicable rights, their application is subject to national procedural rules, including limitation periods, provided these are no less favour- 29 THE PRINCIPLE OF MEMBER STATES’ PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY
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