in the absence of procedural rules of the then Community, each Member State must define, within its domestic legal system, the procedural conditions for enforcing rights under Community law, provided that these national rules: 1) are not less favourable than those applicable to similar actions of a purely domestic nature (principle of equivalence); 2) do not make the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law impossible or unduly difficult (principle of effectiveness). The Rewe and Comet decisions are presented as an expression of the principles of cooperation and subsidiarity, at a time when EU law had not yet significantly influenced national procedural systems and the enforcement of European law was highly decentralised. Based on those decisions, the idea was consolidated that Member States had “procedural autonomy” to design their civil justice systems, provided they respected the requirements for effective and equivalent protection of rights conferred by EU law. In general, the notion of Member States’ procedural autonomy is a concept of EU law, to be interpreted autonomously, that concerns Member States’ freedom to regulate the procedures by which they apply Union law. The delimitation between substantive EU requirements and national implementing rules is central, encompassing not only the process in the strict sense but also the State’s administrative organisation and responsibility. Over the following decades, the Court of Justice began to scrutinise numerous aspects of national civil procedure – including time limits, procedural standing, precautionary measures and rules of evidence – always with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness and equivalence of EU law’s application. At the same time, the European regulatory framework has changed profoundly: from an almost empty landscape in 1976, half a century later there has been an “unstoppable wave” of European instruments, with increasing density, including the enshrinement of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, various directives and regulations with total or partial procedural content, the Court of Justice’s case law with a direct impact on civil procedure, as well as “soft law” instruments. able than those governing similar national actions and do not render the exercise of Community rights practically impossible. The decision is significant for confirming national procedural autonomy within the limits of effectiveness and equivalence in the application of EU law rights. 30 CARLOS TORRES
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