language, how their ranking and recommendation systems operate. Article 27, in particular, requires transparency about the logic of recommender systems, while Article 26 mandates disclosure of the main parameters that influence visibility. For very large platforms such as Google, the regulation goes further. Articles 34 and 35 impose an obligation to assess systemic risks related to manipulation, bias and the spread of deceptive information, and to adopt proportionate mitigation measures. In practice, this represents a decisive shift: the digital evaluation of restaurants, once governed only by private terms of service, is now subject to public-law duties of transparency and accountability. The DSA does not regulate the substance of restaurant ratings or the algorithms that generate them. It does, however, require openness regarding the functioning of such systems and the economic logic behind them, including paid promotion and sponsored visibility. This transparency framework effectively turns platforms into quasi-public spaces where trust is constructed making reputation itself a matter of legal significance. It also introduces a measure of procedural fairness in how restaurants are ranked and presented, bridging the divide between private algorithmic governance and the wider principles of EU consumer and market law. Doctrine13 has long argued for regulation of such certification systems, to ensure its reliability and credibility. The purpose is to establish clear legal criteria governing their operation, so that users are not misled into assuming that the best-rated results necessarily reflect higher quality, when in fact such rankings may reflect the commercial interests of the intermediary platform14. While the Michelin model rests on the authority of expert judgment, online platforms construct visibility through collective input and automated ranking. The outcome is a new kind of reputational hierarchy produced by user interaction and algorithmic design, what several scholars now describe as “algorithmic reputation”15 These platforms are no longer merely cultural or editorial ventures; they are now explicitly governed by the regulatory framework of the DSA. 13 Vd. Vilalta Nicuesa, A, La regulación europea de las plataformas de intermediarios digitales en la era de la economía colaborativa, Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, N.º 765, pp. 265-320. 14 Vd. Lapiedra Alcamí, R, Restricciones impuestas por el legislador europeo a los servicios de intermediación en línea en materia de publicidad digital, (Dir.) Castelló Pastor, J, Análisis del Reglamento (UE) de servicios digitales y su interrelación con otras normas de la Unión Europea, Aranzadi, 2024, pp. 205-243 15 Vd. Katell, A., Reflections on Algorithmic Reputation: Judgment and Equity in a Digitally Mediated Society (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 2020). 610 AFONSO RIBEIRO CAFÉ
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