to all States Parties, regardless of the features of their respective legal orders. According to some scholars, the findings of such observations in a specific case do not affect the interpretation of the Covenant’s provisions.49 In order to overcome such limit, on 10 December 2008 the General Assembly adopted optional Protocol to ICESCR (Resolution A/res/63/117), which entered into force on 5 May 2013.50 Such Protocol makes provision for the possibility to submit to the CESCR – by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party – communications “claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party” (Article 2 of the Protocol).51 Nevertheless, the prospects for development of the procedural protection provided therein are still uncertain,52 also as a result of the recent Italian constitutional case‑law. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has recently affirmed that the provisions of the ECHR, insofar as they integrate Article 117, par. 1, of the Constitution as interposed norms, become the object of balancing, through the ordinary operations, so that the necessary “integration of protections” may be achieved,53 which it is for the Constitutional Court to ensure in the exercise of its functions.54 The review of conformity to the Constitution of the ECHR norms under Article 117, par. 1, of the Constitution “must be carried out with reference to the system, and not to individual provisions considered in isolation. A fragmentary interpretation of legislative provisions – both constitutional and ordinary – risks, in many cases, leading to paradoxical results that would end up contradicting their very protective purposes.”55 Within such a case-law, expressions such as “balancing” and “systemic, and not isolated, assessment” – that is, not exclusively aimed at protecting at the highest level the right involved in the case at hand, but rather intended to balance all constitutionally relevant interests, principles, and rights – seem oriented to scale down the importance, and thus to limit the binding force, not only of the ECHR 49 See G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo al Patto sui diritti economici, sociali e culturali tra luci ed ombre, in Federalismi.it, No. 3/2015, p. 43. 50 Such protocol has been ratified by Italy with Law 3 October 2014, No. 152. 51 On this protocol see P. Gargiulo, Il Protocollo facoltativo al Patto sui diritti economici, sociali e culturali, in G. Venturini, S. Bariatti (eds), Diritti individuali e giustizia internazionale. Liber Fausto Pocar, Milano, 2009, p. 339 ff.; G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit. 52 E. Olivito, Il diritto costituzionale all’abitare: spunti teorico-dogmatici e itinerari giurisprudenziali, in Pol. dir., No. 3/2016, p. 396. For a deeper analysis of the critical profiles of the Protocol see G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 38 ff. 53 Corte costituzionale, judgement 28 November 2012, No. 264. 54 See G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 39. 55 Corte costituzionale, judgement 15 January 2013, No. 1, esp. ground 8.1. Our translation. 440 FRANCESCO GASPARI | LUIGI CAMERIERO
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