but also of the other international treaties concerning human rights, including, therefore, those protecting economic and social rights.56 From such an approach it clearly emerges that ordinary judges are “invited” to be cautious in importing interpretations that could “distort” internal balances, even when such hermeneutic contributions result in more intense protection of the individual right involved in the case at hand.57 Such caution will be more incisive where the ordinary judge is faced with an international monitoring body that does not issue judgments since it is not formally jurisdictional, such as the CESCR, and with the possible economic and financial repercussions of its interpretations and observations. Such hetero‑induced “prudence” risks mortifying their [ordinary judges’] essential function and at the same time is liable to diminish, rather than maximise, the protection of the rights at issue.58 In any case, domestic judges are nonetheless required to consider, in their balancing operations, the interpretative contributions of the CESCR, in order to give correct interpretation and application to an international treaty that undoubtedly finds coverage in Article 117, par. 1 of the Constitution.59 However, the aforementioned case-law of the Constitutional Court remains; likewise, the problem of the prevalence of the internal balances carried out by that Court as compared to those conducted by external judicial and monitoring bodies persists. A scholar holds, in that regard, that when international courts and so‑called ‘quasi‑judicial’ bodies deliver decisions, the margin of appreciation enjoyed by States has already been assessed; if therefore a violation has been established, this is not undone by re‑performing domestically the balancing of the interests, principles, and fundamental rights involved. The same author adds that there is no internal court of appeal that can overturn the res judicata or the outcome of the review by an international body, and the ensuing international obligations must in any case be respected.60 The violation of Article 11, par. 11 of the ICESCR, brought about by the inaction of the national legislature in giving effect to its prescriptions, is not only of political significance, but undoubtedly represents a failure to comply with the international obligations to which the State has subjected itself by virtue of Article 117, par. 1 of the Constitution.61 56 See G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 40. 57 G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 41. 58 G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 41. 59 See G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 43. 60 G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 43-45. 61 G. Di Giovanni, L’entrata in vigore del Protocollo facoltativo, cit., p. 57. 441 WATER GOVERNANCE AND RIGHT TO FOOD
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